Impartial observer theorem with ambiguity

Popularity in location games

Strategic analysis of fair rank-minimizing mechanisms with agent refusal option

<mml:math xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" altimg="si4.svg" display="inline" id="d1e956"> <mml:mi>k</mml:mi> </mml:math> -boundedness, feasible communication structures, and the Myerson value

Abstention, multiple issues, and the Banzhaf power index

Cooperative games with unpaid players

Impartial observer theorem with ambiguity

Popularity in location games

Strategic analysis of fair rank-minimizing mechanisms with agent refusal option

<mml:math xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" altimg="si4.svg" display="inline" id="d1e956"> <mml:mi>k</mml:mi> </mml:math> -boundedness, feasible communication structures, and the Myerson value

Abstention, multiple issues, and the Banzhaf power index

Cooperative games with unpaid players